Restaurant Delivery Payment-Skimming Campaign
Posted by fiej 6 hours ago
Comments
Comment by ModernTimes 5 hours ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racketeer_Influenced_and_Corru...
Comment by bnmathm 2 hours ago
Even when I've been able to track down hosts, registrars, etc for scraped duplicates of sites, and report to all and Google, Microsoft Safety Scanner, etc -- nobody acts (or certainly not in any reasonable enough time to be useful).
In one case the scammer was using our own logo served directly from a source we could replace with Cloudflare rewrites. So the hijacked logo became "THIS IS A SCAM SITE" while we replaced the one on production.
Comment by brian_cunnie 45 minutes ago
I act. I receive about 5 takedown notices every day--the curse of running an open source DNS service (nip.io/sslip.io).
I've received over 1,000 takedown requests, but none came from Cloudflare or Google. Most of them come from Netcraft, Phishlabs, and doppel.com.
Comment by arcfour 11 minutes ago
This is literally false. They are one of the few hosts I have dealt with that actually does NOT do this. Their abuse reporting form even has check boxes that are optional to forward it to the underlying host and the owner. If you leave them unchecked they don't forward anything.
I don't know where you got your information from but it's quite literally the opposite of reality.
Now, whether or not they actually act on it depends on whether they are proxying the site or merely providing authoritative DNS. If they are just providing DNS they will continue to provide it and deny your report and I think that's stupid and frustrating. If they are proxying it they will put up a block page in front of it which is meh.
Comment by bvcp 4 hours ago
Comment by toomuchtodo 3 hours ago
Comment by mlmonkey 3 hours ago
Comment by lokar 1 hour ago
Comment by BatchJob 29 minutes ago
Maybe its time to turn off the web. Its only going to get worse.
Comment by pixl97 5 hours ago
Comment by ModernTimes 5 hours ago
Comment by Crunchified 4 hours ago
Brands and their ordering providers that watch for their site loading under someone else's domain, or for checkout sessions that never reach the real payment provider, are well placed to catch these sites early.
It can be detected if the IT folks look in the right places. I suppose a SCAM ALERT page could be presented to a reverse proxy when discovered.
Comment by StilesCrisis 4 hours ago
Comment by ano-ther 1 hour ago
Comment by trollbridge 5 hours ago
Comment by Ekaros 4 hours ago
Comment by warkdarrior 5 hours ago
Comment by gwerbin 4 hours ago
Comment by BeetleB 2 hours ago
In the old days, delivery was limited to pizza, and occasionally Chinese. You'd call the restaurant directly and place the order. The only possible way a scammer would get you is if you called the wrong number. That's why we had the Yellow Pages.
It seems from comments here that Google is a lot less reliable than the Yellow Pages were.
Comment by mayneack 14 minutes ago
Comment by DANmode 4 hours ago
Excuse me while I go throw up, can’t believe I just recommended that.
Comment by mrguyorama 5 hours ago
Why are they allowed to direct you to literal scams? Why are they allowed to profit off of literal scams?
This affects the company I work for, who gets called every single day with customer complaints from people who clicked the scam link from a search ad when looking for our site.
Our site has existed for over a decade. There's no justifiable reason that a company who's brand is known by every single grocer or merchant to somehow show up under a literal fly by night scam company pretending to have the same name. It's unacceptable.
My sister got scammed by this exact mechanism just last week.
Comment by _def 5 hours ago
Comment by logicallee 2 hours ago
What could we possibly do to limit the damage from this? Malicious Chrome extensions can also rewrite entire web pages, so if bad actors purchase or infiltrate legitimate extensions, they can also put users at risk.
We are considering continuing work on our own browser, since we could ship certificates to use client-side, but it's a recursive problem since our users would have to get the first trusted version before they could trust updates to it. If they have trouble reaching our site in the first place, through poisoned Google search results, poisoned DNS, and poisoned IP routing, then it is difficult to do this.
Comment by IncreasePosts 2 hours ago
Comment by logicallee 2 hours ago
[1] https://stateofutopia.com/laws/2/law2/law2.html
Save that page (with curl or wget), you should get this sha256:
BFE524880867A84C9A438A057734B58954B860843BDB5B15C9E4ED70C534126D (updated after I removed a script injection attack).
though if you're reading this comment through a proxied Hacker News clone, someone might rewrite that hash to their version of what they want our law to say.
Comment by human_eyes 17 minutes ago
Comment by JSR_FDED 3 minutes ago
Comment by NamlchakKhandro 1 hour ago
Comment by jijji 32 minutes ago
Comment by emacdona 4 hours ago
Either:
- They actually decided to remove one of the most annoying things about the modern web... and replace it with something very similar to tell you that they removed it, or...
- They found some legal justification for getting me to accept their cookies for dismissing the "no cookie banner banner"
Either choice makes me think less of them.
[edit: added extra newlines so bullets showed up correctly]
Comment by rationalist 3 hours ago
Comment by handoflixue 4 hours ago
Then it links to a page which is even more explicit about how little they collect: https://www.infohawk.com/cookies
Comment by emacdona 1 hour ago
My point is: they did all the necessary work required (no third party tracking cookies) to NOT HAVE TO show a banner...
... and then they chose to show a banner.
Comment by akersten 2 hours ago
Is it just some JS on bad.com shuttling assets from the real site and displaying them on the fake one? Shouldn't the right CORS headers from the real site prevent this?
Is it a real browser running on a server somewhere visiting the real site, and then rendering that output on a <canvas> on the fake site to avoid the browser's built in protections against this kind of thing? And throwing up their own credit card entry form when the time is right?
Maybe the answer's in there somewhere. Too much Claudish to parse through.
Comment by mik3y 1 hour ago
So you don't need to worry about CORS from the perspective of the web app, nor need a real browser, because the victim is only ever interacting with the evilsite endpoints.
Certainly there are ways the target site could try to thwart this (i.e. detect unusual request patterns from wherever the proxy server is fetching from; client-side JS to detect the site being hosted on a foreign domain; etc). But at that point it's an arms race.
Comment by jihadjihad 1 hour ago
jummyjonhsanbich
jummyjorsandvotch
Can’t wait to bring a big ole box of Jummy Jor sandvotches into the office on Monday.Comment by 0x4e 5 hours ago
Comment by StilesCrisis 4 hours ago
Comment by hnburnsy 3 hours ago
And yet Google says sideloading is where users are getting hijacked. FFS
The hackers should pass on the order to the real restaurant to reduce suspicion.
>Google's public Ads Transparency pages now show "Can't find ad" for the creatives and "No ads found" for the domains we checked, which suggests Google has taken them down
So much for transparency, removing evidence that Google served ads on these impersonating domains
Comment by yh11 5 hours ago
Comment by aniq_ui 4 hours ago