Zero click, silent, remote Android DoS
Posted by MarkBlah 10 hours ago
Comments
Comment by mrb 20 minutes ago
Comment by Retr0id 6 hours ago
Comment by goody71 3 hours ago
Comment by MarkBlah 2 hours ago
Comment by qmr 1 hour ago
Comment by phoghed 1 hour ago
But imo it's not a bad thing. Most sites looked like shit in the past. The content is usually where I focus my changes when dealing with LLM generated HTML. And if I want it slightly less LLM flavored in terms of design I just pick a random design system to tell it to use. Apple HIG, IBM Carbon, etc.
Usually just picking your own palette, a design system, and making it remove all the stupid details it decides to add will improve your end result by a lot.
Comment by Steltek 1 hour ago
Also, I want to expunge the word "shape" from my vocabulary at this point. I think I'm developing a nerve twitch just reading it.
Comment by darkwater 7 hours ago
Maybe I'm wrong and naive but given that the AU law was done to force people move forward from 3G only phones because the network was being shutdown and 000 moved to 5G (I believe), it's a law for operator to contact their customers still using an old phone and migrate them to a newer one. I doubt they will block automatically the number if you are under that DOS for a few days in a row.
Comment by erebussss 6 hours ago
Comment by dools 5 hours ago
You doubt correctly. The law is about blocking IMEI numbers of phones that use the 3g network to dial 000 despite being 4g devices.
Comment by erebussss 5 hours ago
Comment by darkwater 4 hours ago
Comment by dools 4 hours ago
The law was very specifically focused on preventing devices that operate on 4g for all calls except 000 from connecting to the network.
Comment by cowlevel 1 hour ago
Comment by chinathrow 7 hours ago
Comment by dools 6 hours ago
Comment by jeroenhd 7 hours ago
Correct me if I'm wrong, but the carrier configuration messages can normally only come from carriers. The demo APK sends a message to the phone itself, but sending SMS messages requires special confirmation.
Practically speaking, what's the risk?
Comment by zamalek 32 minutes ago
1. Revenge on an ex.
2. Send someone the packet, set up a situation where they need to call 911.
Comment by tyingq 5 hours ago
That's not what the readme on the repo says.
"Install on a sender device, enter (or auto-fill from an active SIM) the target number, pick the sending SIM, and tap SEND CRASH SMS. Observe on the target..."
Comment by cowlevel 1 hour ago
Comment by MarkBlah 4 hours ago
Only “fix” for this attack is to place SIM card in a non-Android phone to ack the inbound messages, or wait a few days of constant disconnects.
Comment by ffsm8 3 hours ago
Or did I misunderstand you and can you input any phone number to cause this issue? If so that would sound more like a carrier issue then a android issue to me
Comment by amluto 3 hours ago
1. A carrier should not be able to render my device unusable in a manner that persists after I remove the SIM.
2. Dual SIM is a thing. One carrier should not be able to disable the other one.
(You do appear to be incorrect on the technical point as well.)
Comment by whizzter 6 hours ago
Comment by ufmace 4 hours ago
I'd like to know - can any devices actually put such a malformed message onto the carrier network? It probably requires at least a custom app that would never be allowed on an app store, if it's possible at all. And do any carriers actually let it go through their network and to a device like a normal message? It's entirely possible the malformed message would crash some software in the carrier's processing stack first and so never be delivered. And if it doesn't, they could easily add a check to block such messages. It's difficult to believe they don't already have some sort of protection against spamming tons of messages to any device. It's also entirely possible it works differently on different carriers, and some but not others might add blocks for this but not make a press release about it or anything.
This seems more like meh, minor bug, fix it quietly in the next Android release, not OMG the world is on fire to me.
Comment by MarkBlah 1 hour ago
Apk provided can be installed on an attackers phone, you specify the msisdn (phone number) of victims phone, click send and it crashes telephony app of the victim.
Multiple messages may create a race condition that corrupts an SQLite database that stores message which stops telephony from functioning as a phone. WiFi will still work so I guess you can use it as a tablet as long as you don’t mind the constant dialogs popping up.
Tested in AU, US, DE and UK with 100% success rate.
Comment by dns_snek 3 hours ago
The author has provided an APK that claims to do just that. Hacking tools aren't allowed on app stores, no, but that has no bearing on the severity of vulnerabilities they exploit.
> And do any carriers actually let it go through their network and to a device like a normal message? It's entirely possible the malformed message would crash some software in the carrier's processing stack first and so never be delivered.
Apparently, unless you're accusing the author of lying.
> And if it doesn't, they could easily add a check to block such messages.
Your ISP could block RDP but that doesn't lessen the severity of RDP vulnerabilities, shift responsibility, or lessen the need for the vendor to respond in any way, that's not how this works.
This is an Android vulnerability and it should be assumed that the carrier is indifferent, actively hostile, cooperating with law enforcement to carry out this attack, or someone might carry out this attack using an IMSI catcher.
> It's difficult to believe they don't already have some sort of protection against spamming tons of messages to any device.
20? I doubt it. Do you think the author is lying?
> It's also entirely possible it works differently on different carriers, and some but not others might add blocks for this
Indeed. What's indefensible is Google's classification that this isn't a security vulnerability.
Comment by vijaybritto 6 hours ago
Comment by Geezus_42 5 hours ago
Comment by pnt12 5 hours ago
For the lulz.
Comment by Geezus_42 4 hours ago
Comment by kirth_gersen 3 hours ago
Comment by int0x29 54 minutes ago
Comment by _trampeltier 7 hours ago
Comment by jeroenhd 6 hours ago
Comment by mzajc 6 hours ago
Comment by rvba 6 hours ago
perhaps even a rogue employee
Comment by t_mahmood 6 hours ago
Comment by DaSHacka 3 hours ago
Comment by izacus 1 hour ago
And it's not that hard, bring down a VPN or some core routing service.
Comment by izacus 1 hour ago
How do you make calls without trusting them?
Comment by MarkBlah 6 hours ago
Comment by jonathanstrange 6 hours ago
Comment by dmitrijbelikov 8 hours ago
Comment by shrimppersimmon 7 hours ago
:grimace:
Comment by zamalek 40 minutes ago
Comment by rickdeckard 5 hours ago
Overall a bit frustrating to have such a fancy webpage with a dedicated address, but then no description on how to actually #1 identify and #2 recover an affected device...
> "Once the database is corrupt, com.android.phone no longer needs a fresh message to fail: it crashes immediately on every boot as it reads the damaged store [..] a factory reset only helps temporarily"
Can't I delete the storage of com.android.phone instead of a full factory-reset?
Comment by ratdragon 5 hours ago
Comment by rickdeckard 5 hours ago
The page describes that this part is resolved by putting the SIM into a non-Android device to receive the queued messages and acknowledge to the network.
To then recover the device it only vaguely mentions "adb commands" and "factory reset", but I can't find a description what actually needs to be done on the device.
I guess the specific question is: The message database that is corrupted due to this issue, is this DB owned by (and stored as part of) com.android.phone?
Comment by jpl56 7 hours ago
Comment by user2722 7 hours ago
Comment by cowlevel 1 hour ago
Comment by embedding-shape 6 hours ago
Comment by ece 7 hours ago
Comment by Geezus_42 7 hours ago
Comment by broken-kebab 7 hours ago
Comment by Geezus_42 5 hours ago
Comment by lynx97 7 hours ago
Comment by zimpenfish 7 hours ago
It would be unfortunate for them to phone you precisely in the small period where DND was turned on as you walked past the opera house (even a large one would be, what, under two minutes of walking?) and not try you again.
(Because if you have instant location-based DND, yes, it might turn on as you walk by an opera house but equally it would turn off when you were past the opera house. Normally, though, I'd expect location-based DND to only kick in after a certain period of time in the same location - say 10 minutes.)
Comment by thereader12 7 hours ago
Comment by zimpenfish 6 hours ago
Comment by Geezus_42 5 hours ago
Comment by Geezus_42 5 hours ago
Comment by ButlerianJihad 5 hours ago
Just before they were removed, I decided to eliminate all of my Rules and Modes entirely, because they were turning out to be extremely unreliable, and there was a bug whereby the Pixel went back into DND mode after a restart, even when it had already been moved outside of the location. It was also quite unpredictable how any Mode would behave, when there were all kinds of settings for each one, and it was just too much to set up and keep track of.
Today, DND is even more onerous. In the Clock app's Alarms tab, if DND is enabled, the app prevents me from editing or deleting or modifying, in any way, the alarms as they are set. This is terrible. You see, Google really, really wants us to disable DND and keep it off forever. DND is very bad for Android. So they are making it as inconvenient as all-get-out to leave DND enabled. If it were up to me, I'd leave it defaulted to "on" until I wanted to be disturbed.
Comment by cowlevel 58 minutes ago
Items placed in a Bag of Holding may not be retrieved within half a mile of a real-life police station
Comment by DangitBobby 4 hours ago
Comment by zimpenfish 6 hours ago
Comment by tompagenet2 8 hours ago
Comment by necovek 7 hours ago
Perhaps it was never really declassified in the tracker.
Comment by KJs6ZxELzQM37O 7 hours ago
Comment by pitkali 6 hours ago
Comment by est 9 hours ago
Comment by latexr 8 hours ago
Comment by contingencies 7 hours ago
*2767*3855#
Executes a full wipe and firmware reinstall with no confirmation prompt. This was probably it. Don't post the clickable link.Comment by fg137 6 hours ago
Thanks to some genius at Samsung who thinks this is a good idea.
Comment by contingencies 6 hours ago
Comment by cowlevel 56 minutes ago
Comment by nubinetwork 8 hours ago
Comment by sandos 3 hours ago
"core Android Telephony Framework GPS race condition from the early days of Android (roughly 2011–2014)."
My AI was unable to find any existing webpages for this though?
Also there was this:
Comment by izacus 1 hour ago
This requires carrier to cooperate.
Comment by grandfunction 8 hours ago
Comment by iugtmkbdfil834 1 hour ago
- targeted suppression - targeted disruption
Comment by Tepix 6 hours ago
Comment by hackersnooze1 2 hours ago
Comment by MarkBlah 1 hour ago
Comment by soltanov 8 hours ago
Comment by klhs 9 hours ago
Comment by anonymous908213 8 hours ago
Comment by klhs 6 hours ago
Comment by dspillett 6 hours ago
That is a function of the training data/method, like many of AI's problems. This doesn't stop it being a problem of course, but it shouldn't be a surprise.
Big bugs, like heartbleed, over the years have had breathy websites going over how serious the problem is because the problem was that serious, so the models associate that sort of wording with bug reports. Less serious bugs don't get the same excited treatment, repeated in many many places, so more measured descriptions figure in the training data relatively less.
Comment by paxy 6 hours ago
Comment by MarkBlah 1 hour ago
Comment by MarkBlah 9 hours ago
Comment by luca020400 6 hours ago
EDIT: actually already fixed in https://review.lineageos.org/c/LineageOS/android_frameworks_...
There's yet another PDU fixup that stems from negative index
Comment by klhs 8 hours ago
Comment by j16sdiz 7 hours ago
False negative? I honestly don't know what we can do about it. If this is a real issue, maybe another llm will rediscover it and it eventually will get triaged right?
Comment by klhs 6 hours ago
Comment by MarkBlah 1 hour ago
Comment by coldfloor 8 hours ago
Comment by paxy 6 hours ago
Comment by advisedwang 2 hours ago
Additionally, even those that dislike slop may still upvote a security issue that they think is important.
Comment by MarkBlah 1 hour ago
Comment by cowlevel 54 minutes ago
Comment by kirth_gersen 3 hours ago
Comment by DaSHacka 3 hours ago
The discussion is moreso about the vulnerability (and PoC) itself rather than the AI-generated aspects.
Comment by 0xcrypto 9 hours ago
Comment by solyin 9 hours ago
Comment by autoexec 9 hours ago
That has more to do with the severity of heartbleed than the fact that it had a name and a logo. I've since seen a lot of vulnerabilities try to market themselves with websites, cute names, and stupid logos but I still don't remember them because they still just weren't big enough to actually be memorable.
Comment by cowlevel 55 minutes ago
Comment by rustyhancock 8 hours ago
Before this practice in general you simply released the exploit and see if enough chaos triggers a fix.
Comment by exploderate 8 hours ago
Comment by couchand 1 hour ago
Comment by therealmarv 7 hours ago
Comment by embedding-shape 6 hours ago
A bit like the postal system. Yes, it's meant to send physical letters and what not to my home, but it still sucks when I get ads that just goes straight into the trash. Yes, you're using the system as intended, but I still consider your business slop if you send ads to me this way.
Comment by MarkBlah 1 hour ago
Comment by __m 9 hours ago
Comment by xuhu 7 hours ago
Comment by MarkBlah 9 hours ago
Comment by syshyk 7 hours ago
Comment by rickdeckard 5 hours ago
Disclaimer for non-aussies (like me): That's not the newest hacker slang for something, 000 is the phone number of Australian's emergency services...
Replace with "can cut you off from 911" or 112, 999, etc. as needed (optionally wear sunglasses and add hand-gestures to amplify the effect)
...or just call it "emergency services"
Comment by EdwardDiego 8 hours ago
Look at this Claude shit:
> Zero-click. The victim does nothing. No tap, no open, no notification.
> Silent. Nothing appears in Messages; the attacker's number is never shown.
Congrats, now you sound like yet another AI YouTube advertisement. "You control when we... ...woohoo"...
OP, please, if you think you have important information, please write it up yourself, I am so sick and tired of being sent LLM generated Markdown files with zero human input, and now you're just publishing that on a website.
FFS.
Oh you had Claude publish your name presumably so you'd get credit for "your" "discovery".
Mark Blaszczyk, please do better.
Comment by dsr_ 7 hours ago
Comment by cowlevel 52 minutes ago
Comment by MarkBlah 7 hours ago
the message is silent, no notification notifying of the attackers origin, doesn't matter if it's locked, or connected to mobile data, so i stand by what is written.
I don't care about the credit, i have enough CVE's under my belt which are higher severity, none which have dedicated write-ups. i care that this gets fixed and give answers to those who are experiencing their phones constantly disconnecting from carrier.
Comment by cyclopeanutopia 2 hours ago
Comment by coldfloor 8 hours ago
The trend of Claude referring to everything as having a "shape" irrationally annoys the hell out of me. What an absolutely idiotic way to say "X is like Y."
Comment by birdsongs 7 hours ago
I used to write like this, but I can't anymore. (I suspect enough people did in the training set that that's why it ended up being part of the vernacular.)
Comment by tamimio 4 hours ago
Comment by kome 7 hours ago
Comment by yellow_lead 9 hours ago
err, how can I send an SMS like this? Would a mobile network even accept/forward such an SMS?
Little hard reading through the vibe slop here
Comment by lesspassiveobse 7 hours ago
Comment by jeroenhd 7 hours ago
I think Android removed the ability to send more annoying messages through its normal APIs (like flash SMS messages) but if you have access to any modem (either a smartphone or a full ESP32 dev board costing <50 bucks on AliExpress for 4G LTE), you can bypass any such restriction.
Carrier firewalls will probably filter these messages out but I wouldn't rely on it.
Comment by 1116574 6 hours ago
Those APIs are probably still online, and still require to nail your ass to the contract, but technically I would assume it's possible.
Comment by Good4boothee 1 hour ago
Comment by rustyhancock 8 hours ago
But not all SMS are text messages for the user.
Comment by snitch182 8 hours ago
Comment by LtWorf 8 hours ago
My provider had given me a remotely managed router. It was trivial to change the configuration and have it work normally.
Comment by cowlevel 53 minutes ago
Comment by jeroenhd 7 hours ago
Comment by cowlevel 4 hours ago
Comment by throwa356262 6 hours ago
Also, I don't understand Googles position here. On android the phone ia not part of the OS and can be updated via an app or framework update. Why not just fix this as a functional bug?
Comment by MarkBlah 6 hours ago
Google are rather vague in their triage, they just said temporary DoS does not qualify, then rejected to investigate further.
Comment by dools 5 hours ago
Comment by mah4k4l 2 hours ago
Comment by bossyTeacher 4 hours ago
eSims are great until they are not. Give me a second physical SIM tray over an eSim any day of the week.
Comment by hjadoui 5 hours ago
Comment by villgax 9 hours ago
Comment by MarkBlah 9 hours ago
Comment by pogue 8 hours ago
I'm not familiar with WAP Push and how it works, but is it possible to disable it or block that port on a non-rooted phone?
Comment by motionlessveloc 7 hours ago
Comment by metamicr 40 minutes ago
Comment by campbell000 2 hours ago