An open DNS recursive service for free security and high privacy
Posted by mooreds 4 days ago
Comments
Comment by Habgdnv 4 days ago
Comment by TacticalCoder 3 days ago
By now I expect many sites to be filtered out: too much crap out there.
Then I also run my own DNS (unbound) and after seeing a warning from one of my banks about a phishing site where one letter differed in the domain name from the real bank's site, I went ballistic: I did generate hundreds of thousands (maybe millions by now) of variations of the names of banks/brokers domains I use, with every single variation of one character and many variations of up to two characters and I nullroute those too (in addition to known porn and known malware sites).
And I nullroute every single Unicode domain name. I don't care. I don't care if you disagree with this: too many homoglyph attacks. Too risky. And the Web Just Works [TM] without accessing any Unicode domain.
I null route tens if not hundreds of TLDs.
Filtering out every single domain name using any Unicode char is a bit more involved but it's doable (I do it since years, but today you can ask LLMs if you want to do it or patch a DNS software to do it).
I know some go further and by default disallow everything and then only allow domains they want to use but I find that a bit too tricky.
Now... Should there be something I really want, say I want a shady torrent tracker to download some dubious file, I can always use a VM/container with a more lenient DNS.
I'm using such a setup since years. My unbound DNS runs on a Pi 3 that's on 24/7.
Works flawlessly.
P.S: on another subject I also blocklist entire IP blocks, including entire countries. Same thing: the Web still works totally fine.
Comment by snapplebobapple 3 days ago
Comment by greggsy 3 days ago
Obviously. You’re continually tinkering with it.
The vast majority of people do not share the same hobby of troubleshooting and tweaking home DNS of all things.
Comment by spl757 2 days ago
Comment by LeoPanthera 4 days ago
Comment by drewfax 3 days ago
I don't want my family to get malware from sketchy websites. Quad9 offers a simple solution for these usecases. I'll take the false positive anyday over unfiltered DNS.
Comment by yunaflox 23 hours ago
Comment by rdevilla 3 days ago
Comment by greyface- 4 days ago
Comment by ebb_earl_co 4 days ago
That might not be an issue for your situation, but I recall the benefit of something like Quad9’s offering is the encryption between client and their endpoint(s), particularly for untrusted ISP or similar.
Comment by staviette 3 days ago
Downside is Quad9 can see all your DNS traffic. But without it if you run your own recursive resolver your ISP sees all your queries, and many others see portions of them, unencrypted.
Comment by kayson 3 days ago
This hopefully shouldn't be an issue for long with stuff like RFC 9539 and OOTS/SVCB.
Comment by egberts1 3 days ago
Comment by winstonwinston 4 days ago
Used to be fine. I stopped doing it when average TTL dropped to 300 seconds and it takes far too long for my local recursor to get the answer >100ms, when 3rd party resolver delivers in <10ms.
Comment by pocksuppet 3 days ago
cache-min-ttl: 3600 // seconds
cache-min-negative-ttl: 3600 // seconds
or serve-expired: yes
serve-expired-client-timeout: 20 // milliseconds to wait for resolution before serving the old value to the clientComment by clownstrikelol 3 days ago
prefetch: yes
Tada, now your unbound serves records faster than the round trip out to anything off your own network in most cases.Comment by bigstrat2003 3 days ago
Comment by tosti 3 days ago
Comment by Cider9986 4 days ago
Comment by annoyingnoob 4 days ago
Comment by winstonwinston 4 days ago
Comment by esseph 4 days ago
It can, it depends on the systems and user patterns. Example: if an end user is going to the same site over and over, those DNS responses are probably cached locally on the device, and may also be cached on any upstream resolvers. OTOH if you were somebody without a Facebook account that went to Facebook.com to view a post from a link, you could easily have 120 different DNS lookups for various resources on that domain that haven't been DNS or web resource cached yet.
Comment by jordand 4 days ago
Comment by LeoPanthera 4 days ago
From AT&T fiber, Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 is always the fastest, though Quad9 is a very close second.
It’s interesting that it’s different from different ISPs.
Comment by ButlerianJihad 3 days ago
--- 8.8.8.8 ping statistics ---
10 packets transmitted, 10 received, 0% packet loss, time 9015ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 23.666/25.241/27.628/1.022 ms
--- 9.9.9.9 ping statistics ---
10 packets transmitted, 10 received, 0% packet loss, time 9015ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 23.811/25.256/27.003/1.024 ms
--- 1.1.1.1 ping statistics ---
10 packets transmitted, 10 received, 0% packet loss, time 9014ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 13.216/14.553/15.835/0.739 ms
Of course, these ICMP reply times are apples-to-oranges comparisons. With the proper tooling, you should be able to measure DNS reply latencies.Comment by greggsy 3 days ago
Comment by jedberg 3 days ago
Comment by doublepg23 3 days ago
Definitely blew my mind coming from the ~20ms DOCSIS adds.
Comment by jedberg 3 days ago
Comment by Linserin 4 days ago
Comment by abdulocracy 4 days ago
Comment by siramikvarze 4 days ago
https://torrentfreak.com/dns-resolver-quad9-loses-global-pir...
Comment by wayofthepie 2 days ago
https://quad9.net/news/blog/quad9-turns-the-sony-case-around...
Comment by gertrunde 3 days ago
It felt like a simple (rather brute force) filter that cut out a lot of potential noise/malicious activity
Comment by peter_d_sherman 3 days ago
OK, let's understand the following:
Yes, it is absolutely true that there are malicious web sites, malicious API's, malicious endpoints on the Internet, most having hostnames, aka domain names, that can be blocked on lookup...
It is, generally speaking, a good idea to block malicious hostnames, malicious domain names, if they can be identified, if they can be known. And usually they can.
But there is a problem with performing such blocking however, and this is not a problem specific to Quad9 -- it's a problem for any DNS provider.
The problem can be simply stated as follows:
If you have the power to block any hostname, any domain name, any web service or web site whatsoever, then...
...how do you know that you are not accidentally blocking any legitimate, morally upstanding, ethically correct, legal, lawful, web services or websites, inadvertently?
?
In other words, for every 50,000 or so malicious domain names, how do you know that you didn't drag in at least one legitimate/legal/lawful one into that mix?
You see, it's philosophical question!
It's a variation of "Who guards the guardians?" (Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quis_custodiet_ipsos_custodes%...)
In other words, it raises such questions as "What's the resolution process if a lawful website is inadvertently blocked?" and "What is the criteria for blocking a website?" and "Who determines that criteria?", etc., etc.
Simply put: Who guards the guardians?
Now, this being said, we do appreciate everything that Quad9 and other free/privacy-focused DNS services do and provide.
We can make the counter-argument that privacy-focused DNS providers in general are "the good guys" and that for every 10,000+ domains with malicious intent, maybe only 1 or 2 actually legal, lawful, law-abiding domains are ever actually accidentally blocked -- and that would be a good counter-argument...
It's a great life to browsers to get rid of all of the malicious websites, but it's a horrendous life to individual legal lawful website owners when their ethical website is blocked for no apparent reason via an unaccountable non-transparent black-box service with no formal resolution process or channel!
Heard of "The Great Firewall of China"?
Most of that is implemented via DNS blocking!
Via DNS providers!
So in the future, I'd love to see a more, let's call it "responsibility-focused" DNS provider, one that at least attempts to notify any party that is blocked, notifies users of blocks, and has an open, public and transparent dispute resolution service for any party whose domain is blocked.
Anyway, in the interim, we thank Quad9 and the other privacy-focused DNS providers for their services!
Comment by sbseitz 3 days ago