Supply chain attack alert: .github/setup.js
Posted by antihero 4 days ago
Our org GitHub just got compromised massively by a supply-chain attack. Vectors are
* Claude hooks
* Gemini hooks
* Cursor setup
* VScode tasks
It adds all of the above to execute node .github/setup.js, an obfuscated file.
Check infected: `rg --hidden --no-ignore 'node .github/setup.js`
It spreads by adding mimic'd skip-ci commits to open PRs which then get merged.
Payload is obfuscated, available on request.
If this is already a known one in the world, apologies, it hit us at around 10PM BST last night, the damage would have been incredible.
Still trying to identify the original source.
Comments
Comment by gionn 4 days ago
Comment by icflorescu 3 days ago
My full analysis and IOCs: https://dev.to/icflorescu/the-bot-that-never-was-2mfp (source repo on codeberg: https://codeberg.org/icflorescu/miasma-github-incident)
Comment by antihero 12 hours ago
This has royally fucked a lot of people.
Comment by christeamrs 4 days ago
Comment by gionn 3 days ago
Comment by antihero 4 days ago
Comment by nhecker 4 days ago
And after a quick glance I'm not seeing any correlation between "Hades - The End for the Dammed" and this worm; would also love a source for this claim.
Comment by antihero 4 days ago
The main attack is using compromised repo keys to:
* Create malicious actions to JSON dump and exfiltrate all GitHub org secrets.
* Commit the payload delivering hooks/scripts to any repo/PR it has access to.
* Mimics previous commits/timestamps, however you can see the key that did it by seeing the push in activity/audit logs.
Comment by thejaybird 4 days ago
Decoded execution chain ----------------------- 1. Outer layer: - Starts with try{eval(function(s,n){...})([large numeric array].map(...).join(""),1)) - Converts numeric character codes into a string. - Applies a Caesar +1 shift to alphabetic characters. - eval() executes the decoded layer.
2. First decoded layer: - Imports node:crypto. - Defines an AES-128-GCM decryptor. - Decrypts two embedded payloads: a) _b: small Bun bootstrap/loader b) _p: large obfuscated payload (~686 KB) - Writes _p to a temporary JS file under /tmp/p<random>.js. - If Bun is available, runs: bun run "<temp file>" - If Bun is unavailable, downloads Bun from GitHub releases and then runs the payload.
3. Small loader payload: - Downloads Bun v1.3.13 from: https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13... - Uses curl and unzip. - Creates temporary directories under /tmp/b-* - Runs the large payload using Bun.
4. Large payload: - Obfuscated JavaScript with a string-table decoder and a second custom encrypted string layer. - After decoding strings, the payload clearly contains credential and secret collection logic.
Observed behaviour / capabilities --------------------------------- The payload appears to collect or search for: - GitHub tokens / PATs / GitHub Actions OIDC tokens - npm tokens and npm OIDC package exchange tokens - RubyGems API keys - AWS credentials, STS metadata credentials and Secrets Manager secrets - Azure credentials, service principals and Key Vault secrets - GCP service account tokens and Secret Manager secrets - Vault tokens and Vault secrets - Kubernetes service account tokens and kubeconfig - Docker credentials - SSH keys and config - Git credentials - .env files and common project secrets - Claude configuration and project files - OnePassword items via the op CLI - Slack, Discord, Signal, Telegram and Element local data - Crypto wallet files such as Exodus, Ledger Live, Ethereum keystores and Monero data - Shell and database history files
Exfiltration / persistence style -------------------------------- The payload contains logic to: - Create or use GitHub repositories through GitHub API endpoints. - Commit collected data/content into repository files. - Add/update files such as: - .vscode/tasks.json - .claude/index.js - .claude/settings.json - .claude/setup.mjs - .vscode/setup.mjs - Use commit messages such as: - chore: update dependencies - create del-commit: - Create a GitHub repo with description: - Hades - The End for the Damned - Use api.anthropic.com with path v1/api as an apparent outbound endpoint. - Use a token/string: - IfYouYankThisTokenItWillNukeTheComputerOfTheOwnerFully
Notable URLs / endpoints ------------------------ - https://api.github.com - https://api.github.com/graphql - https://github.com/ - https://github.com/actions/runner - https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13... - https://registry.npmjs.org/ - https://registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/oidc/token/exchange/pack... - https://registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/tokens - https://registry.npmjs.org/-/whoami - https://rubygems.org/api/v1/api_key.json - https://rubygems.org/api/v1/gems - https://cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com/v1 - https://secretmanager.googleapis.com/v1 - https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me - https://login.microsoftonline.com/ - https://vault.azure.net/.default - http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token - http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credent... - http://169.254.170.2 - http://127.0.0.1:8200 - api.anthropic.com / v1/api
Files/globs targeted -------------------- - */.env - */.env.local - */.env.production - */.git/config - */config/database.yml - */wp-config.php - .env - .git-credentials - .npmrc - ~/.npmrc - ~/.pypirc - ~/.yarnrc - ~/.aws/config - ~/.aws/credentials - ~/.azure/accessTokens.json - ~/.azure/msal_token_cache.* - ~/.config/gcloud/access_tokens.db - ~/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json - ~/.config/gcloud/credentials.db - ~/.docker/config.json - ~/.docker//config.json - /root/.docker/config.json - ~/.kube/config - /etc/rancher/k3s/k3s.yaml - /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token - ~/.terraform.d/credentials.tfrc.json - ~/.ssh/id - ~/.ssh/id_rsa - ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 - ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa - ~/.ssh/config - ~/.ssh/known_hosts - ~/.gitconfig - ~/.config/git/credentials - ~/.netrc - ~/.bash_history - ~/.zsh_history - ~/.python_history - ~/.psql_history - ~/.mysql_history - ~/.claude.json - ~/.claude/* - ~/.claude/projects/* - ~/.claude/mcp.json - %USERPROFILE%\.claude.json - %USERPROFILE%\.claude* - ~/.config/Slack/Cookies - ~/.config/discord/Local Storage/leveldb/* - ~/.config/Signal/* - ~/.local/share/TelegramDesktop/tdata/* - ~/.config/Element/Local Storage/* - ~/.config/Exodus/exodus.wallet/* - ~/.config/Ledger Live/* - ~/.ethereum/keystore/* - ~/.monero/* - ~/.local/share/keyrings/.keyring - ~/.kde/share/apps/kwallet/.kwl - ~/.config/filezilla/sitemanager.xml - ~/.config/filezilla/recentservers.xml
Environment variables checked ----------------------------- - GITHUB_ACTIONS - GITHUB_REPOSITORY - GITHUB_REF - ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL - ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN - TARGET_REPOS - AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID - AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY - AWS_SESSION_TOKEN - AWS_PROFILE - AWS_REGION - AWS_DEFAULT_REGION - AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE - AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI - AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI - AWS_CONTAINER_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN - AZURE_TENANT_ID - AZURE_CLIENT_ID - AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET - AZURE_FEDERATED_TOKEN_FILE - AZURE_KEY_VAULT_NAME - GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS - GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT - GCP_PROJECT - GCLOUD_PROJECT - KUBECONFIG - VAULT_ADDR - VAULT_API_TOKEN - VAULT_TOKEN_FILE - VAULT_TOKEN_PATH - VAULT_AWS_ROLE - VAULT_ROLE - HOME - USERPROFILE - LANG / LANGUAGE / LC_ALL / LC_MESSAGES (edited)
Comment by nhecker 4 days ago
Comment by thejaybird 4 days ago
Public repo > infect by merge > github runner picks up and gets infected > and github action (from a repo) that then runs on runner getw effected
Comment by nikita2206 4 days ago
Comment by antihero 4 days ago