We X-Rayed a Suspicious FTDI USB Cable
Posted by aa_is_op 5 days ago
Comments
Comment by ChrisMarshallNY 5 days ago
But the fact that most comms cables, these days, have integrated chips, makes for a dangerous trust landscape. That’s something that we’ve known for quite some time.
BTW: I “got it right,” but not because of the checklist. I just knew that a single chip is likely a lot cheaper than a board with many components, and most counterfeits are about selling cheap shit, for premium prices.
But if it were a spy cable, it would probably look almost identical (and likely would have a considerably higher BOM).
Comment by woleium 4 days ago
Comment by shagie 4 days ago
Adam Savage's Tested : Look Inside Apple's $130 USB-C Cable - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AD5aAd8Oy84 (1 minute in "we've been saying that our phones have more computing power than the Apollo guidance computer but I'm positive now that this cable has more computing power than the Apollo guidance computer")
That video is a look at cables (not just Apple's) with Lumafield's CT Scan.
Comment by ssl-3 4 days ago
It's a good watch, and I learned some new stuff about some things that I only knew a little bit about before.
Comment by Thorrez 4 days ago
Comment by ssl-3 4 days ago
Thanks!
Comment by pm215 4 days ago
Comment by DeathArrow 4 days ago
Comment by nkrisc 4 days ago
Comment by HPsquared 4 days ago
A concern: with all this computing onboard, does this mean a malicious USB-C cable could record screen and keystroke?
Often the keyboard receiver is plugged into the monitor's USB hub and so screen and HID are both going along a single cable ... Which also does power delivery. Such cables are a definite "sales category" and could be a target for supply chain attacks. But if they now have chips onboard, doesn't that mean an attacker could even takeover a genuine cable? It seems like a real risk tbh.
Comment by wolrah 2 days ago
Keystrokes: Easily. At least for USB 3 and 4, USB 1/2 data is a physically separate channel that just happens to almost always be packaged alongside the faster stuff, so the lower speed stuff like input devices is easy to intercept. I don't know if Thunderbolt does the same or not, normally USB-C alternate modes still keep the USB 2.0 signals available but Thunderbolt might be an exception.
Screen: Probably not modern video modes in a purely stealthy cable formfactor *YET*, at least not using COTS parts, but it wouldn't surprise me to find the secret squirrel types either already have it or are working on it.
Comment by jamesy0ung 4 days ago
Comment by ChrisMarshallNY 4 days ago
It is possible that the tech exists, but isn't yet at a point that it can be easily mass-produced, which means "spy cables" may actually be available, from Q-types.
Comment by shagie 4 days ago
Comment by Yoric 4 days ago
Comment by pseudohadamard 3 days ago
Comment by amarant 4 days ago
I assumed the "suspicious" cable was a spy cable, and then guessed that the bigger integrated circuit was probably responsible for doing secret spy stuff, while the smaller circuit up top was all that was needed for ordinary cable work. Turns out the cables do basically the same thing (no fancy spying!), and one is just cheaper.
Comment by araes 4 days ago
The large chip looks like it's purposely placed to intercept every single incoming signal, and then route them through afterward. Just because they're "experts" does not mean they notice issues that a "naive" observer might have noticed. Get lost in the trees.
It looks like a big chip for doing "secret spy stuff".
Comment by sidewndr46 4 days ago
Comment by speff 4 days ago
Amazon, ebay, and similar others for the (cheaper) counterfeits.
Comment by Nurbek-F 4 days ago
Comment by ChrisMarshallNY 4 days ago
Comment by quietsegfault 4 days ago
Comment by bragr 4 days ago
Comment by sandworm101 4 days ago
Comment by mcdeltat 4 days ago
Comment by invokestatic 5 days ago
I want to make a persistent implant/malware that survives OS reinstalls. You can also disable Intel (CS)ME and potentially use Coreboot as well, but I don’t want to deal with porting Coreboot to a new platform. I’m more interested in demonstrating how important hardware root of trust is.
Comment by userbinator 5 days ago
I want to make a persistent implant/malware that survives OS reinstalls.
Look up Absolute Computrace Persistence. It's there by default in a lot of BIOS images, but won't survive a BIOS reflash with an image that has the module stripped out (unless you have the "security" of Boot Guard, which will effectively make this malware mandatory!)
I’m more interested in demonstrating how important hardware root of trust is.
You mean more interested in toeing the line of corporate authoritarianism.
Comment by invokestatic 4 days ago
As a power user, do I want boot guard on my personal PC? Honestly, no. And we’re in luck because a huge amount of consumer motherboards have a Boot Guard profile so insecure it’s basically disabled. But do I want our laptops at work to have it, or the server I have at a colocation facility to have it? Yes I do. Because I don’t want my server to have a bootkit installed by someone with an SPI flasher. I don’t want my HR rep getting hidden, persistent malware because they ran an exe disguised as a pdf. It’s valuable in some contexts.
Comment by taneq 4 days ago
Comment by fc417fc802 4 days ago
Comment by kachapopopow 4 days ago
certificate companies sell trust, not certificates.
Comment by fc417fc802 4 days ago
There's absolutely no excuse for hardware vendors not to provide end users the choice.
> trust is protected by trusted companies...
The less control of and visibility into their product you have the less trustworthy they are.
Comment by kachapopopow 4 days ago
asus gives out keys to sign bios firmware, now aliexpress can not only counterfeit, but provide tampered hardware.
you can enroll your own secure boot keys so that's not really relevant.
Comment by fc417fc802 4 days ago
I'll grant that if the user is given control then compromise within the supply chain does become possible. However the same hypothetical malicious aliexpress vendor could also enroll a custom secure boot key, install "definitely totally legit windows", and unless the user inspects he might well never realize the deception. Or the supply chain could embed a keylogger. Or ...
Comment by kachapopopow 4 days ago
Comment by taneq 4 days ago
That’s not what I got from their post. After all, they’re putting in some effort to hardware backdoor their motherboard, physically removing BootGuard. I read it as “if your hardware is rooted then your software is, no matter what you do.”
Comment by Nextgrid 5 days ago
Try attacking NIC, server BMC or SSD firmware. You will achieve your goal without any hardware replacement needed.
Comment by invokestatic 5 days ago
Comment by cbsks 5 days ago
Comment by da_chicken 5 days ago
Comment by mschuster91 5 days ago
You want to look into something called "Windows Platform Binary Table" [1]. Figure out a way to reflash the BIOS or the UEFI firmware for your target device ad-hoc and there you have your implant.
Comment by baby_souffle 5 days ago
Is this how various motherboard manufacturers are embedding their system control software? I was helping a family friend with some computer issues and we could not figure out where the `armoury-crate` (asus software for controlling RGB leds on motherboard :() program kept coming from
Comment by Nextgrid 4 days ago
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Comment by BobbyTables2 4 days ago
Comment by ronsor 5 days ago
Comment by yjtpesesu2 4 days ago
Comment by hex4def6 4 days ago
There are two ways you could interpret "counterfeit".
1. Fake IC (identifies as FTDI 232 IC), fake cable (FTDI logo on it)
2. Real IC, fake cable (eg, I buy the FTDI IC and make the cable, and sell it as an "official" FTDI cable).
(1) is I assume what they mean in this instance., but you could argue (2) is also possible. However, they make no mention of the packaging both calling them "FTDI" cables. Instead, I assume they're going off what they report to the OS as.
FTDI have been around for decades, and the offhand "old cable we had kicking around" could easily mean its 15+ years old. That might easily explain the chip size difference. In this case, FTDI did make TSSOP 28-pin chips for a long time. They're now obsolete, superseded by SSOP package variants (like in the "Real" picture). Put another way, this is like comparing an i5-10400 to a Pentium II that I found in my storage closet and declaring the Pentium II fake.
The actual fake chips visually look identical to the real ones. Obviously, otherwise they wouldn't get mixed into the supply chain.
The only real conclusion they can realistically make from these x-rays are that they're not the same cable (but even then, I don't know if FTDI real cables have silently upgraded the internals while retaining the same SKU).
Comment by krater23 3 days ago
Comment by gregsadetsky 5 days ago
"The O.MG Cable is a hand made USB cable with an advanced implant hidden inside. It is designed to allow your Red Team to emulate attack scenarios of sophisticated adversaries"
"Easy WiFi Control" (!!!!!)
"SOC2 certification"? Dawg, the call is coming from inside the house...
Comment by mschuster91 5 days ago
Helps corporate red teams in environments where the purchase department is... a bunch of loons.
Comment by sllabres 4 days ago
I can't second that, but more to the software/driver side.
Without my knowledge, I once had a counterfeit cable that costed several days of my life. At that time, the FTDI drivers recognized (and as I read did some other things [1]) that a counterfeit cable was connected, but instead of simply disabling the function, they impeded it. In my case: After pressing the first few keys on terminal connection, the transmission from the device to the PC worked, but not the reverse direction. A long search for the error came to an end after I replaced the USB/RS232 with a new one. This was with windows, with Linux even the counterfeit worked.
[1] https://www.elektroda.com/qa,ftdi-ft232-scandal-driver-brick...
Comment by commandersaki 5 days ago
Comment by nanolith 4 days ago
I'm not too keen these days with FTDI's reputation for manipulating their Windows device drivers to brick clones. So, while I'm familiar with their IC, I don't give them any more money. The next time I need a USB to serial cable, I'll bust out KiCad to build it using one of the ubiquitous ARM microcontrollers with USB features built in. Of course, this is easier for me, since I can write my own Linux or BSD device driver as well. Those using OSes with signing restrictions on drivers would have a harder time, unless they chose to disable driver signing.
Comment by the_biot 4 days ago
I think it's just some generic microcontroller emulating FTDI's protocol in software, but it can't keep up with high-speed transfers of course, and that's how they noticed there was a problem.
Comment by Liftyee 4 days ago
Comment by LiamPowell 4 days ago
Comment by nanolith 4 days ago
Comment by userbinator 5 days ago
USB-serial adapters are not particularly special. Dozens of other manufacturers make them.
Comment by hakfoo 4 days ago
If I buy a FTDI based adapter, it might brick, and I lack the detection skill or supply chain control to be sure that it won't happen.
If I buy a CH340 or PLwhatever based adapter, that doesn't enter the calculus.
Unless I had some explicit "only FTDI can possibly do it" need, I'm going elsewhere.
Comment by alyandon 4 days ago
I am not nearly sophisticated enough as an end user to spot a counterfeit FTDI usb-to-serial device so I am not going to risk buying that brand and end up with their drivers intentionally bricking the device.
Comment by dotancohen 4 days ago
Comment by sandworm101 4 days ago
Comment by dotancohen 4 days ago
Comment by sandworm101 4 days ago
Comment by trinsic2 5 days ago
Comment by Mawr 4 days ago
It's sufficient to look at something as basic as the arrangement of cables on the left. The crooked electrical elements on the right are also a big tell.
This works because good—and bad—qualities correlate with each other.
Comment by Neywiny 5 days ago
Comment by mjevans 5 days ago
Why allow for newer processes on the counterfeit? They'd implement it using the least expensive, most mass produced chips possible, which are more likely to be cut from wafers hitting the sweet spot of size / feature and price crossover.
Comment by trinsic2 5 days ago
Comment by blibble 5 days ago
which is definitely the second
Comment by llbbdd 4 days ago
Comment by kps 5 days ago
Comment by tamimio 4 days ago
I remember years ago I had similar issue, I got one of those FTDI USB cable to interfere with a drone payload, and it was simpler to just plug in the USB cable into the jetson rather than having a small exposed circuit around, but I ended up having performance issues and interruptions that eventually I replaced it with traditional FTDI exposed circuit, I still have the cable till now but I don’t have the X ray machine to check!
Comment by gnabgib 5 days ago
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Comment by stainablesteel 5 days ago
they could be regulated to expose their chip with transparent covering rather than plain dark wiring
Comment by androng 5 days ago
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Comment by kundejenny 2 hours ago